Resilience and cohesion of Ukrainian society during the war

This report was drafted by the team of the Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Research (UCIPR) as part of the activities of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion (National Platform). This civic initiative was launched in February 2018 (formerly known as the National Platform ‘Dialogue on Peace and Secure Reintegration’).

The report is based on data on events in 12 oblasts of Ukraine which are important for shaping a policy of national resilience. The project’s target oblasts were selected based on analysis of changes in cohesion of local populations due to the outbreak of military operations and include Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Kherson, Chernivtsi, and Chernihiv oblasts. For data collection, we distinguish between the temporarily occupied areas, frontline and deoccupied areas, and relatively rear areas.

UCIPR is grateful for the materials supplied by participants of the Regional Network of National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion, Volodymyr Merezhko, Denys Hrechko, Andrii Romanenko, Mykola Yatskiv, Dmytro Arabadzhyiev, Oksana Ivasiv, Viktoriia Demchenko, Tamara Astakhova, Diana Barynova, Dementii Bielyi, Nataliia Nechaieva-Yuriichuk, Liubov Muliovana. 

SUMMARY 

The situation at the front line

In March–April 2026, the front line remained generally stable, despite the high intensity of fighting along the main axes. Russian forces failed to achieve operational breakthroughs or significantly alter the configuration of the front. Even where they made local advances, these were mostly tactical and came at significant cost. As a result, the attacking side increasingly targeted civilian infrastructure, residential buildings, hospitals, energy infrastructure, and logistics and life-support facilities. These strikes not only caused material damage but also exerted psychological pressure on the population and complicated the operation of various services.

Ukrainian forces retained the ability to hold back the enemy and strike its equipment, air defence systems, command posts, and logistics. This was reflected, in particular, in local counterattacks and strikes on ammunition depots, supply routes, and military infrastructure both in the temporarily occupied areas and deep in Russia’s rear.

Overall, the enemy’s advances remained localised and, according to ISW assessments, the pace of the offensive was slowing. At the same time, this did not remove the threat of further attacks, as in a war of attrition, resources, logistics, technology, and the parties’ ability to sustain a prolonged high intensity of fighting became increasingly important.

І. TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AREAS

Throughout the spring, the forced integration of the occupied areas of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts into Russia’s political, administrative, economic, and digital framework continued. Preparations for the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation in autumn 2026, the issuance of Russian foreign passports, and tighter control over property, the economy, and digital services pointed to an effort to entrench the occupation as a long-term model of governance.

Repression, seizure of property, control over communications and personal data, forced passporting, and conscription campaigns remained the key instruments of integration. Through these mechanisms, the population became increasingly dependent on the occupying administrations, Russian documents, and public services of the RF.

Plans to resettle Russian citizens, the purchase of new housing in Mariupol by people from Russia, the militarisation of education, and ideological work with children and young people were aimed at changing the composition of the population and weakening ties between the seized areas and Ukrainian government-controlled territory.

Meanwhile, the occupying authorities were unable to ensure basic living conditions: humanitarian crises, infrastructure problems, staff shortages, and dependence on budget subsidies from the centre persisted. In the long term, this deepened social and demographic losses and complicated the future recovery and reintegration of these areas.

ІІ. FRONTLINE AND DEOCCUPIED AREAS

The security situation strongly affected most areas of life: governance, the operation of critical infrastructure, evacuation, education, transport, economic activity, humanitarian assistance, and social support. In these conditions, long-term planning often gave way to rapid responses to current challenges, although in some oblasts there were already visible attempts to prepare in advance for repeated crises through backup power supply, getting ready for the heating season, creating protected educational spaces and digital mechanisms for recording needs and damage.

Community resilience varied considerably. Communities relatively far from the front line were still able to maintain the provision of basic services, plan recovery, and develop some social and economic support tools. In communities close to the combat zone or the border, by contrast, public utility, transport, health care, and social services increasingly became fragmented. Transport isolation posed an additional risk: reduced or altered routes in frontline communities made it harder to access health care, administrative services, evacuation, and humanitarian assistance.

Humanitarian support generally remained effective but was under excessive strain. International, state, municipal, and volunteer assistance covered the population’s basic needs, water supply, health care, evacuation logistics, and backup power supply. However, dependence on external resources was still one of the key risks.

Housing recovery and support for IDPs were urgently needed. Various procedures, including the eRecovery programme, housing certificates, local payments, and remote inspections of damaged property, were gradually being adapted to wartime conditions. However, the scale of destruction significantly exceeded the pace of compensation and actual recovery. Unresolved problems included long-term housing, stable employment, access to social services, and integration into host communities.

The economic resilience of frontline communities depended largely on whether local businesses could continue operating despite security risks, logistical restrictions, power supply disruptions, and damage to property. Practical tools to support entrepreneurs were used in the oblasts, including local tax benefits, grants, compensation, partial reimbursement of costs for generators and solar power plants, and platforms for dialogue between the authorities and businesses. However, these measures helped maintain basic economic activity rather than create conditions for full development, as businesses continued to operate under constantmilitary, financial, and regulatory pressure.

Mobilisation processes, the work of territorial recruitment and social support centres and military medical commissions, reservation procedures, and issues of procedural fairness continued to fuel tensions.

Stronger administrative measures may have been necessary from the perspective of defence capability, but without transparent rules, proper communication, and response to abuses, they could erode trust in institutions. Corruption cases involving military medical commissions, reservation procedures, defence-related construction, shelters, recovery, and procurement had a similar effect: in frontline conditions, they were perceived not so much as financial violations, but as matters of security, fairness, and trust in the authorities.

ІІІ. RELATIVELY REAR AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

Despite their distance from the front line, the relatively rear areas remained vulnerable to drone and missile attacks, which affected the energy sector, transport, housing stock, and critical infrastructure.

Preparations for the next heating season and the implementation of comprehensive resilience plans remained key areas of activity. The oblasts channelled resources into cogeneration, backup power supply, autonomous water supply, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the development of distributed power generation. However, the main challenge was moving from approved plans to practical implementation under conditions of limited resources and constant security risks.

The social sector operated under increased strain. The needs of war veterans, IDPs, persons with

disabilities, and families of military personnel continued to grow. In response, communities developed rehabilitation services, accessibility measures, employment initiatives, psychological support, and veteran entrepreneurship programmes. However, the accumulation of these needs gradually became a long-term challenge for local budgets and social support systems.

The activity of volunteers, businesses, and international partners remained an important resource for communities. Through a combination of local initiatives, international assistance, and inter-municipal cooperation, communities maintained social infrastructure, implemented modernisation projects, and supported the Defence Forces of Ukraine. Nevertheless, many areas remained highly dependent on external support, especially in meeting energy-related needs, restoring infrastructure, and providing social services.

The erosion of public trust posed a distinct risk. Corruption scandals, conflicts around mobilisation measures, the lack of transparency in certain decisions, and delays in addressing accumulated problems heightened tensions between citizens and institutions. Public demand for fairness, accountability, and effective communication by the authorities also continued to grow.

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