Resilience and cohesion of Ukrainian society during the war

This report was drafted by the team of the Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Research (UCIPR) as part of the activities of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion (National Platform). This civic initiative was launched in February 2018 (formerly known as the National Platform ‘Dialogue on Peace and Secure Reintegration’).

The report is based on data on events in 12 oblasts of Ukraine which are important for shaping a policy of national resilience. The project’s target oblasts were selected based on analysis of changes in cohesion of local populations due to the outbreak of military operations and include Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Kherson, Chernivtsi, and Chernihiv oblasts. For data collection, we distinguish between the temporarily occupied areas, frontline and deoccupied areas, and relatively rear areas.

UCIPR is grateful for the materials supplied by participants of the Regional Network of National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion, Volodymyr Merezhko, Denys Hrechko, Andrii Romanenko, Mykola Yatskiv, Dmytro Arabadzhyiev, Oksana Ivasiv, Viktoriia Demchenko, Tamara Astakhova, Diana Barynova, Dementii Bielyi, Nataliia Nechaieva-Yuriichuk, Liubov Muliovana. 

SUMMARY 

The situation at the front line

In May–June 2026, Russian forces continued to launch intensive strikes, while heavy fighting persisted along the entire front line. In Donetsk oblast, Russian forces did not achieve a significant breakthrough but maintained pressure along the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad, Kostiantynivka, and Kramatorsk axes. In some areas, they expanded the grey zone, while the main urban areas remained under the control of the Ukrainian Defence Forces. The enemy continued attempting to infiltrate in small groups and gain a foothold in built-up areas. In Zaporizhzhia oblast, active hostilities continued, with Russian forces attempting to advance in the areas of Huliaipole, Orikhiv, and Stepnohirsk and striking the oblast centre and communities across the oblast.

Russian forces used guided aerial bombs, ballistic missiles, strike drones, and FPV drones. Attacks on public transport, bus stops, commercial facilities, and residential areas became more frequent. In late June, attacks caused large-scale power outages in Zaporizhzhia and Zaporizhzhia raion.

Along the Prydniprovske axis in the Ukrainian-controlled part of Kherson oblast, the intensity of Russian ground operations decreased to a certain extent. A large-scale crossing of the Dnipro remained unlikely because of intensified Ukrainian strikes on Russian military supply routes on the left bank. The main threats to the right-bank communities were FPV drones, remote mining, and strikes on civilian infrastructure. In Kherson and riverside communities, Russia continuously attacked residential areas, transport, health care facilities, and humanitarian sites with drones. Because of the persistent danger, the authorities changed transport routes and evacuated residents and some institutions, while remote mining made movement around the city increasingly difficult.

In Kharkiv oblast, Russian forces increasingly used guided aerial bombs and strike drones against residential areas and civilian infrastructure. The situation remained most difficult in Vovchansk and other parts of the Southern Slobozhanskyi axis, where Russian units attempted to infiltrate in small groups and establish positions near the state border. Along the Kupiansk and Lyman–Sloviansk axes, the enemy continued its attacks but did not achieve a significant breakthrough.

In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, regular attacks spread from the Nikopol area to Synelnykove raion. Nikopol communities were regularly struck by drones and artillery, while intensified air strikes on Vasylkivka prompted some residents to leave. Individual strikes on Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih targeted logistics and economic infrastructure important for maintaining supplies to both the oblast and the front.

In Chernihiv oblast, border communities continued to come under daily shelling. Attacks on filling stations emerged as a separate trend: on 30 June alone, strikes were recorded at four filling stations. By late June, the possible expansion of ground hostilities had become a separate risk. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi described the prospect of a Russian offensive from Bryansk region as a realistic scenario. Such an offensive could have stretched the front line and diverted Ukrainian reserves from other axes. No signs that such an offensive had begun were recorded within the monitoring period.

In Odesa oblast, energy facilities, civilian vessels, residential buildings, health care institutions, and transport were targeted alongside port infrastructure. The Danube area of Odesa oblast remained a particular target of Russian attacks because of its importance for exports and international logistics.

The Ukrainian Defence Forces intensified strikes on Russian logistics in occupied areas and on oil refining facilities in Russia. Roads, bridges, and transport interchanges that supported the supply of Russian forces and the land corridor to Crimea remained under fire control. Strikes on oil refineries and fuel infrastructure reduced fuel production and disrupted supplies to the Russian military.

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